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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 This matter is an appeal and a cross-appeal from a jury 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on his claim under the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") and in favor of the 
defendant employer on plaintiff's federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA") claim.  The appeal and cross-appeal raise 
issues concerning the appropriate jury instructions in a pretext 
age discrimination case under New Jersey law, the appropriateness 
of certain evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, 
and the propriety of the awards for back-pay damages, attorneys' 
fees, and costs.  We conclude that the district court did not err 
in instructing the jury as to the burden of proof required for 
the NJLAD claim, that any errors with respect to the district 
court's evidentiary rulings were harmless, that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the judgments, and that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in failing to reduce the back-pay 
and attorneys' fees award.  However, we conclude that the 
district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining 
the plaintiff's award of costs.  We will therefore remand solely 
on that issue and affirm the district court in all other 
respects.1 
 
 I. 
 Bernard Abrams was employed by Lightolier, Inc. 
("Lightolier" or "the employer") from January 1970 until his 
termination on July 3, 1986.  Abrams was hired as a Manager of 
Physical Distribution.  From 1982 through July 3, 1986, he was 
the Vice President of Coastal Fast Freight, an in-house trucking 
company and subsidiary of Lightolier.  In 1981, Abrams organized 
a system for combining the purchasing power of a number of 
companies to obtain significant price reductions.  He headed this 
system, known as Team Purchasing, from its inception until late 
1985.  During 1983 and 1984, Abrams was also given primary 
responsibility for negotiating real estate transactions for 
Lightolier.  Abrams asserted that between 1982 and 1986, he 
received ample salary increases and bonuses.  After returning to 
                     
1
. The district court had jurisdiction over the ADEA claim 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 626(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1367.  This court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (permitting appeal to Court of 
Appeals from matters tried by consent before U.S. Magistrate 
Judge) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
work following coronary by-pass surgery in the fall of 1985, 
Abrams claimed that Lightolier began to restrict his job 
responsibilities.  On July 3, 1986, he was terminated.  At that 
time he was fifty-nine years old.  Abrams was replaced with a man 
whom he had hired, trained, and supervised.  Abrams estimated 
that his replacement was about forty years old. 
 During his tenure with Lightolier, Abrams was 
responsible for dealing with Midland Transportation Company, Inc. 
("Midland"),2 a company that provided trucking services to 
Lightolier.  In June 1980, Abrams orally agreed to modify the 
shipping rates in Lightolier's local contract with Midland.  The 
companies performed under the oral modification until Midland 
sued Lightolier in 1982, claiming that it was being underpaid 
according to the terms of its written contract.  Midland also 
claimed that Lightolier owed it detention charges for waiting 
periods caused by Lightolier's delay.  During the Midland 
litigation, Lightolier learned that Abrams and two other 
employees, Richard Petit and John Zarkoski, had accepted various 
favors from Midland or its principals.3  The Midland litigation 
was settled in late June 1986, just before the jury was to return 
                     
2
. Midland was a successor to the trucking company EZ 
Freight Lines.  For ease of reference, we refer to both companies 
as Midland. 
3
. Abrams was alleged to have taken bribes from Midland's 
principals and to have received a number of less significant 
favors such as free car repairs.  Abrams has consistently denied 
the bribery charge and offered explanations to show that he did 
not act improperly in accepting the other favors. 
its verdict.  The Midland litigation cost Lightolier, in 
settlement and attorneys' fees, almost one million dollars. 
 Abrams was not terminated when Lightolier first learned 
of his failure to memorialize the oral modification, of his 
failure to avoid the detention charges, and of the favors he 
accepted from Midland.  Instead, he was terminated on July 3, 
1986, soon after the Midland litigation had settled.  Michael 
Whelan, who had become president of Lightolier in 1985, informed 
Abrams of the termination.  Both Petit and Zarkoski were 
terminated at that time as well.  Abrams supervisor at the time 
of his termination was Richard Kurtz.  Believing his termination 
was part of a campaign to eliminate older workers, Abrams filed 
charges with the New Jersey Civil Rights Division and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  Subsequently, Abrams also 
filed a civil action against Lightolier and various parent 
companies and subsidiaries,4 alleging he was terminated because 
of his age in violation of the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination and the ADEA.5  The parties consented to trial 
                     
4
. In addition to Lightolier, the complaint named the 
following companies as defendants: The Genlyte Group, Bairnco 
Corporation, and Coastal Fast Freight.  Coastal Fast Freight was 
dismissed by stipulation and Bairnco Corporation was dismissed by 
the court prior to trial.  Subsequent to Abrams's termination, 
Lightolier became a subsidiary of The Genlyte Group as a result 
of a corporate merger in 1991.  The district court therefore 
entered judgment against Genlyte and it is Genlyte who has filed 
this appeal.  For ease of reference, we will refer to both 
Abrams's employer and the appellant/cross-appellee as Lightolier. 
5
. Abrams had also asserted a claim of disability 
discrimination which was dismissed by the district court prior to 
trial.  Abrams has not appealed from that order and that claim is 
therefore not before this court. 
before a United States magistrate judge.  Prior to trial, the 
employer moved for summary judgment in its favor.  The magistrate 
judge granted summary judgment in part, dismissing Abrams's claim 
of disability discrimination under the NJLAD and dismissing one 
of the defendants, but denied the employer's motion for summary 
judgment as to the ADEA and NJLAD age discrimination claims.  The 
employer also moved for an in limine order excluding certain 
evidence, which the district court granted in part and denied in 
part.6 
 Trial was held before a jury.  To support his 
contention that Lightolier terminated him because of his age, 
Abrams introduced evidence of prior age-based remarks made by 
Richard Kurtz, his supervisor at the time of his termination, as 
well as evidence that he was replaced by a younger employee, and 
evidence that other older employees at Lightolier had also been 
mistreated by Kurtz.  Lightolier submitted evidence that Michael 
Whelan, the president of the company, communicated the 
termination decision to Abrams, that he, rather than Kurtz, was 
responsible for the Abrams's discharge, and that the reason for 
the discharge was Abrams's earlier misconduct in connection with 
the Midland contract. 
 The case was submitted to the jury as a pretext case, 
i.e. a case that does not qualify for special treatment under 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  However, the 
                     
6
. The magistrate judge also severed from this action a 
counterclaim asserted by Lightolier against Abrams. 
court submitted the NJLAD and ADEA claims to the jury under two 
different standards of proof.  To prevail on the ADEA claim, 
Abrams had to show that age was the sole motivating factor for 
Abrams's discharge, while he could prevail on the NJLAD claim by 
showing that age was a determinative factor in the discharge 
decision.  The jury responded to special interrogatories in the 
following manner.  The jury found that the employer's reasons for 
its actions were pretextual; that age was not the sole motivating 
factor for Abrams's termination; that age was a determinative 
factor in his termination; that the employer was liable for back 
pay, future losses, and damages for pain and suffering, but was 
not liable for punitive damages under the NJLAD.  The district 
court thus entered judgment in Abrams's favor on the NJLAD claim 
and in Lightolier's favor on the ADEA claim.   
 The employer moved for judgment as a matter of law or 
for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the verdict against it and Abrams moved for an award 
of attorneys' fees.  The magistrate judge denied the employer's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, but 
ordered a remittitur of all but $2500 of the $100,000 award for 
pain and suffering, finding Abrams had established mental 
distress damages only to that extent.  Abrams agreed to the 
remitter and an amended order for judgment against the employer 
was entered in the amount of $473,953.45.  The magistrate judge 
awarded Abrams attorneys' fees in the amount of $546,379.59 and 
costs of $240.00.  Lightolier filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the amended order entering judgment in Abrams's favor on the 
NJLAD claim and the order denying its motion for summary judgment 
on the ADEA and NJLAD claims.  Abrams filed a protective cross-
appeal as to the amended order entering judgment in the 
employer's favor on the ADEA claim and cross-appealed as to the 
order awarding him costs. 
 
 II. 
 Lightolier's arguments on appeal fall into three 
general categories: arguments relating to (1) the appropriate 
standard of proof in a pretext case of age discrimination under 
the NJLAD, (2) evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and (3) the amount of back-pay damages and attorneys' 
fees awarded.  Abrams cross-appealed as to the award of costs and 
also filed a protective cross-appeal on the ground that in the 
event the case is remanded for a new trial, his ADEA claim should 
be submitted to the jury under the mixed-motives standard of 
proof.  Because we conclude that the instructions as to the NJLAD 
claim were proper and that the magistrate judge's evidentiary 
rulings do not require reversal, we need not reach the issue 
raised by Abrams regarding the standard of proof for his ADEA 
claim.  Because we conclude that the magistrate judge applied the 
correct standard in instructing the jury as to the back-pay award 
and in awarding attorneys' fees, but did not apply the correct 
standard in determining the award of costs, we will remand solely 
as to the issue of costs. 
  
 III.  Standard of Proof Under the NJLAD 
 In instructing the jury as to Abrams's burden for 
establishing Lightolier's liability for his discharge, the 
magistrate judge explained that the standard of proof under the 
NJLAD and ADEA claims differed, stating:  
 
  As to the federal cause of action . . . 
[i]t is the Plaintiff's burden to prove, by a 
preponderance of the credible evidence, that 
his age was the sole motivating factor for 
the Defendant's decision to terminate his 
employment. . . . 
 
  
 * * *  
  Under the terms of the state claim, Mr. 
Abrams must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that age was a determinative factor 
in the employment decision.  In is not 
necessary under New Jersey law against 
discrimination that age be the sole 
motivating factor.  If discrimination on the 
basis of age made the difference in the 
decision, then discrimination in violation of 
the statute has been established. 
 
  In other words, Plaintiff must prove 
that but for his age he would not have been 
discharged. 
 
  All right?  So under the state law, 
Plaintiff, again, must prove by a 
preponderance of the credible evidence, it is 
his burden of proof, that age was a 
determinative factor in the employment 
decision. 
 
  It is not necessary under the state law 
claim that age be the sole motivating factor.  
That's the difference. 
App. 110-14. 
 In answering special verdicts, the jury found that 
Abrams had proven that the employer's reasons for his discharge 
were pretextual and that age was a determinative factor in 
Lightolier's decision to discharge him.  The jury also found that 
Abrams had not proven that age was the sole motivating factor for 
his discharge.  The magistrate judge therefore entered judgment 
in Abrams's favor on the NJLAD claim and in Lightolier's favor on 
the ADEA claim.   
 In instructing the jury that Abrams was required to 
prove that age was the sole motivating factor in order to succeed 
on the ADEA claim, the magistrate judge believed he was following 
the decision of this court in Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 
457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993).  The 
magistrate judge did not adopt that standard for the NJLAD claim, 
however, concluding that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not 
necessarily follow the higher standard of proof he understood 
Griffiths to require.  Instead, the magistrate judge concluded 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would continue to require a 
showing that age was a determinative factor in the adverse 
employment decision. 
 This court sitting in banc recently clarified the 
proper standard of proof for an ADEA pretext case in Miller v. 
CIGNA Corp., No. 93-1773, __ F.3d __ (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 1995).  
There we stated that "in ADEA cases that do not qualify for a 
burden shifting charge under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989), district courts should instruct the jury that 
the plaintiff's burden is to prove that age played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative 
effect on the outcome of that process."  Miller, slip op. at 3, 
__ F.3d at __.  We also noted that to the extent that Griffiths 
v. CIGNA could be read to require an ADEA plaintiff to prove that 
age was the sole motivating factor for the adverse employment 
action, it was overruled.  Id. at 17 n.8, __ F.3d at __ n.8. 
 Our review over the issue whether jury instructions 
misstate a legal standard is plenary.  Savarese v. Agress, 883 
F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); United States 
v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
906 (1985), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985), and cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).  Our task is to "'determine whether 
the charge, taken as a whole and viewed in light of the evidence, 
fairly and adequately submits the issue in the case to the 
jury.'"  Adams, 759 F.2d at 1116 (quoting Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 
F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)).  
Because New Jersey courts in applying the NJLAD generally follow 
the standards of proof applicable under the federal 
discrimination statutes, see McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 
F.3d 820, 827 (3d Cir. 1994) (predicting that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would adopt the clarification for proving a federal 
pretext discrimination case set forth in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), to claims arising under the 
NJLAD); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 907 (N.J. 
1990), we agree with Abrams that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would likely adopt our holding in Miller as the proper standard 
of proof for an age discrimination pretext claim under the NJLAD.  
The magistrate judge's instructions as to that claim were 
therefore proper.7  While we note that the instructions as to the 
ADEA claim may have required Abrams to demonstrate more than he 
was required to under the appropriate standard, Abrams has not 
cross-appealed on that ground and we therefore leave the judgment 
undisturbed as to the ADEA claim.  Because Abrams filed only a 
protective cross-appeal as to his ADEA claim, and because we 
conclude below that none of the other grounds for reversal urged 
by Lightolier have merit, we do not reach Abrams's argument that 
his ADEA claim warranted an instruction under the standard of 
proof applicable to mixed-motives Price-Waterhouse cases. 
 
 IV.  Evidentiary Rulings 
 Lightolier argues that the magistrate judge erred in 
admitting certain evidence proffered by Abrams and in excluding 
certain evidence that it sought to introduce.  We find that the 
evidence was properly ruled upon, or if it was admitted or 
excluded in error, that it did not affect a substantial right of 
Lightolier in this case.  The district court's evidentiary 
rulings therefore provide no basis for reversing the jury verdict 
in this case.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.8  We also reject 
                     
7
. We also reject Lightolier's argument that the 
magistrate judge's NJLAD charge was otherwise improper because it 
required only a showing that age was a motivating factor in the 
employment decision.  The charge clearly required a showing that 
age was a determinative factor and explained that this meant a 
showing of but-for cause was needed.  The charge therefore 
incorporates the standard articulated in Miller. 
8
. Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
  No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence . . . is ground for 
Lightolier's contention that the evidence does not support the 
verdict against it and we therefore conclude that the district 
court properly denied Lightolier's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. 
 Lightolier takes issue with a number of evidentiary 
rulings made by the magistrate judge prior to and during trial.  
Two of these rulings concern the admission of age-based comments 
by Lightolier executives.  A related ruling concerns the 
testimony of other Lightolier employees who claimed to have been 
the subject of age-based employment decisions by one of those 
decisionmakers.  Another ruling concerns the admission of charts 
prepared by Abrams to represent Lightolier's internal 
organizational structure and the final ruling concerns the 
exclusion of Lightolier's evidence concerning its intent in 
discharging Abrams. 
 When the district court applies the appropriate legal 
standard, evidentiary rulings are subject to the trial judge's 
discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.  In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Government of V.I. v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 914 (3d 
(..continued) 
granting a new trial or for setting aside a 
verdict or for vacating, modifying, or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice.  The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 
Cir. 1992).  Additionally, application of the balancing test 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless 
it is "arbitrary and irrational."  Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation and 
citations omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991).  
Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 errors in 
the admission or exclusion of evidence can not be grounds for 
reversal or a new trial if they constitute harmless error.  
Finally, when a party fails to timely object to the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings during the proceedings, those rulings are 
reviewed under the plain error standard.  United States v. Brink, 
39 F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
 A.  Evidence of Age-Based Comments and 
                 Employment Decisions of Richard Kurtz 
 Underlying Abrams's claim that he was discharged 
because of his age is his belief that during the 1980s there 
existed a corporate atmosphere at Lightolier unfavorable to older 
workers and that Richard Kurtz led this "youth movement."  Kurtz 
was employed as a plant manager at Lightolier's Fall River 
facility and then as a corporate vice president.  He was Abrams's 
supervisor during Abrams's last few months with the company.  
 During the trial, Lightolier objected to two types of 
evidence that Abrams introduced with regard to Kurtz: (1) 
evidence of discriminatory remarks made by Kurtz, and (2) the 
testimony of other older former Lightolier employees who alleged 
that they too had been mistreated by Kurtz.  On appeal, 
Lightolier argues that admission of this evidence was improper 
because Kurtz was not a decisionmaker for purposes of Abrams's 
termination and because the evidence was highly prejudicial.  We 
reject both arguments. 
 There was sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably conclude that Richard Kurtz was a decisionmaker for 
purposes of Abrams's discharge.  We find it significant that 
Steven Klosk, a former Lightolier human resource manager, 
testified that in documents submitted to the New Jersey Division 
on Civil Rights in response to their investigation of a claim of 
age discrimination filed by Abrams, Lightolier indicated that a 
number of managers, including Kurtz, participated in the decision 
to discharge Abrams.  App. 852-53.  There was other evidence 
tending to show a connection between Kurtz and the decision to 
terminate Abrams as well.9  We thus have no trouble concluding 
that the jury could have reasonably found that Kurtz played a 
role in Lightolier's decision to discharge Abrams.  Evidence that 
Kurtz harbored age-related animus would thus be relevant to 
                     
9
. This additional evidence included the following:  
evidence that Kurtz was Abrams's supervisor at the time of his 
termination; Kurtz's testimony that he had recommended to another 
Lightolier executive that the leadership of Team Purchasing be 
"rotated" and that he had suggested Doug Pedder as Abrams's 
replacement as chair of Team Purchasing; evidence that when 
Abrams's secretary was assigned to a new president, Kurtz and 
Steven Klosk refused to let Abrams hire a replacement and told 
him to use the typing pool; Abrams's testimony that after he 
fired a subordinate, Kurtz refused to let him fill that position; 
and Abrams's testimony that Kurtz told him in the spring of 1986 
that he would have no more real estate responsibilities.   
determining whether the discharge decision resulted from 
discriminatory motives.  See Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 
834 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that evidence of age-biased comments 
by supervisor could lead to inference that termination decision 
was made because of plaintiff's age); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 
32 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1994) (same).  Indeed, we have held 
that discriminatory comments by nondecisionmakers, or statements 
temporally remote from the decision at issue, may properly be 
used to build a circumstantial case of discrimination.  See 
Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 
1989) (finding age-biased comment relevant even when made 
subsequent to plaintiff's termination); Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 
852 F.2d 715, 733 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding admissibility of 
discriminatory comment by decisionmaker made five years before 
denial of tenure).   
 Abrams's testimony that he had overheard Kurtz say to 
another employee "things would begin to hum around here when we 
got rid of the old fogies," App. 518,10 and the testimony of 
another Lightolier employee that she heard Kurtz refer to two 
plant managers as "a dinosaur" and "the old men," App. 712, were 
therefore relevant.  For these same reasons, evidence as to 
Kurtz's attitude toward other older employees and the manner in 
which he treated them, was also relevant.  See Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (circumstantial evidence 
                     
10
. Abrams testified that he understood "old fogies" to 
refer to senior management above Kurtz, not older employees in 
general.  App. 611-12. 
of discrimination includes evidence "that the employer in the 
past had subjected [the plaintiff] to unlawful discriminatory 
treatment, that the employer treated other, similarly situated 
persons out of his protected class more favorably, or that the 
employer has discriminated against other members of his protected 
class or other protected categories of persons"); cf. Josey v. 
John Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting that atmosphere in which a company makes its employment 
decision can be circumstantial evidence of discrimination).  Both 
the comments and the evidence of how Kurtz treated older 
employees were probative of whether Kurtz harbored a 
discriminatory attitude against older workers, and if credited, 
that evidence made the existence of an improper motive for the 
discharge decision more probable.  See Fed. R. Evid. 401 
(definition of relevant evidence). 
 Because we have concluded that this evidence was 
relevant, the only remaining question regarding admissibility is 
whether the magistrate judge should have excluded the evidence 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because its probative value 
was outweighed by its prejudicial impact.11  The magistrate 
judge's determination of admissibility under Rule 403 is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.  Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 
F.2d at 187.  Because discriminatory comments by an executive 
connected with the decisionmaking process will often be the 
                     
11
. Lightolier does not argue that the evidence was 
excludable on any other basis. 
plaintiff's strongest circumstantial evidence of discrimination, 
they are highly relevant and a trial court's decision to admit 
such evidence should ordinarily be upheld.  We perceive no basis 
for concluding that the magistrate judge's determination to admit 
Kurtz's age-related comments was an abuse of discretion in this 
case. 
 Lightolier also objected to the testimony of five 
former Lightolier employees who believed they had been mistreated 
by Kurtz because of their age.  Lightolier objects that the 
testimony was highly prejudicial because it concerned treatment 
of employees other than Abrams and created the possibility that 
the jury would find against the employer on the basis of these 
accusations without finding that it had discriminated against 
Abrams.  Although we find the so-called "testimonials" of former 
employees to be less probative of Kurtz's discriminatory attitude 
and more inflammatory than Kurtz's two age-based comments, we 
cannot conclude that the determination that its probative value 
outweighed its prejudicial impact was "irrational and 
arbitrary."12  See Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d at 
                     
12
. Lightolier's reliance on Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 
F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984), is misplaced.  In that case the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the testimony of six 
former employees had been admitted in error because their stories 
did not produce statistically significant evidence of a pattern 
and practice of discrimination and, thus, any probative value was 
outweighed by the prejudicial impact of "'a parade of witnesses, 
each recounting his contention that defendant has laid him off 
because of his age.'"  Haskell, 743 F.2d at 122; see also 
Moorehouse v. Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390, 393-94 (E.D. Pa.), 
aff'd without op., 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980).  However, because 
the Haskell plaintiff had admitted the evidence to show a 
"pattern and practice" of discrimination, the court was not 
187.  We therefore conclude that the admission of the evidence 
concerning Kurtz provides no basis for a new trial. 
 
 B.  Testimony that Lightolier "Frowned On" Older Workers 
 Lightolier also objected to the testimony of Milton 
Hinsch, a former purchasing manager.  Hinsch was in his sixties, 
worked at the Norwich, Connecticut plant, and reported to Douglas 
Pedder, Director of Corporate Purchasing.  There was no evidence 
that either Hinsch or Pedder had anything to do with the decision 
to terminate Abrams.  However, Hinsch testified that in 
connection with his performance reviews, Pedder gave him the 
following explanation about company policy.   
 
  He did tell me that the company frowned 
on older people, that my raises wouldn't be 
as high as he would like them to be, and that 
the company looked at people with gray hair 
as being in a position where they couldn't do 
much about it because they probably couldn't 
get another job. 
App. 919.  Hinsch further testified that there had been several 
discussions with Pedder of the same nature, usually at the time 
of his performance review, and that Pedder repeatedly expressed 
the sentiment that the company frowned on older workers.  
Although Pedder's statement was clearly an out-of-court 
statement, the magistrate judge admitted it under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), which defines as nonhearsay a statement 
(..continued) 
addressing whether the evidence was probative of a discriminatory 
attitude on the part of the employees' supervisor.  See Haskell, 
743 F.2d at 120. 
made by a party's agent concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agent's employment.  The magistrate judge concluded that 
Pedder was authorized to discuss Hinsch's salary and the 
company's employment policies with him.  Lightolier argues that 
the statement should have been excluded as double hearsay outside 
the scope of Rule 801(d)(2)(D).  
 Where a supervisor is authorized to speak with 
subordinates about the employer's employment practices, a 
subordinate's account of an explanation of the supervisor's 
understanding regarding the criteria utilized by management in 
making decisions on hiring, firing, compensation, and the like is 
admissible against the employer.  We so held in Zipf v. American 
Telephone & Telgraph Co., 799 F.2d 889, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1986), 
citing Rules 801(d)(2)(D) and 701.  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals more recently so held in Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 
1050, 1053 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1990).  We perceive no double hearsay 
problem because we do not think the supervisor's explanation, if 
offered through the testimony of the supervisor, would be subject 
to a hearsay objection.  
 Lightolier relies primarily on Carden v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 850 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1988).  In Carden, this 
court reversed a jury verdict in an age discrimination case on 
the ground that a statement attributed to the plaintiff's 
supervisor had been admitted in error.  The plaintiff had been 
told by his supervisor, in the context of not being promoted to a 
position he sought, that the supervisor "thought they wanted a 
younger person."  Carden, 850 F.2d at 1001.  Over the employer's 
in limine objection, the testimony was admitted.  We found that 
the testimony involved "double hearsay" and that the plaintiff 
had not identified a basis for overcoming the hearsay objection 
to the supervisor's account of what the unidentified declarant 
had told the supervisor about the reason for not promoting the 
plaintiff.  The statement of the unidentified declarant was being 
offered to show the reason for the particular employment decision 
affecting the plaintiff and, because the declarant was 
unidentified, there was no way of knowing whether he or she was 
authorized by the employer to make such a statement on this 
subject.  Because this statement was the only evidence of 
discrimination supporting one of the two theories the jury could 
have chosen to support its verdict, we reversed and remanded for 
a new trial.  
 In Carden, the supervisor's statement was understood to 
refer to a specific declaration made to him about the reason 
underlying a particular employment decision and that declaration 
was offered for its truth without the required foundation.  That 
is not the case here.  The magistrate judge understandably viewed 
Pedder's statement as his opinion regarding company policy.  This 
case is governed by Zipf, not by Carden.  
  
 C.  Abrams's Organizational Charts 
 Lightolier also argues on appeal that Abrams introduced 
"pattern and practice" evidence that was not relevant to his 
claim and highly prejudicial, and that the admission of this 
evidence requires a new trial.  The objectionable evidence 
consists of two handwritten organizational charts that Abrams 
prepared from memory and which purported to contain the job 
titles and ages of the members of Lightolier's management team 
located at company headquarters at the level of vice president or 
above in 1982 and 1985 respectively, and a blow up of a chart 
that appeared in a magazine article written by William Blitzer as 
president of Lightolier which contained the names and job titles 
of Lightolier's upper level management, including Abrams.     
 Lightolier attacks this "statistical evidence" on two 
grounds:  that Abrams's used the testimony of other witnesses to 
establish a statistical disparity in the treatment of older 
employees by describing what had happened to the employees listed 
on these charts, and that because the information on this charts 
was, as Abrams admitted, incomplete, the evidence was therefore 
misleading.13  Finally, Lightolier argues that the evidence 
should have been excluded because Abrams brought his claim as an 
individual treatment case and should therefore have been 
precluded from attempting to prove a "pattern and practice" of 
age discrimination. 
 We find Lightolier's arguments unpersuasive.  
Employment discrimination plaintiffs are not precluded from 
introducing statistical evidence as circumstantial evidence of 
                     
13
. On cross-examination Abrams admitted that the charts 
were incomplete.  However, they were not intended to be and were 
not introduced as complete organizational charts of company 
management.  For example, his handwritten charts only purported 
to show the managers at or above the level of vice president at 
Lightolier headquarters. 
discrimination in a disparate treatment case.  Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders 
Co., 882 F.2d 760, 766-67 (3d Cir.) ("By contrast [to a class-
action or pattern and practice case], in individual disparate 
treatment cases such as this, statistical evidence, which may be 
helpful, though ordinarily not dispositive, need not be so finely 
tuned." (internal quotation and citation omitted)), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1062 (1989).  The cases cited by Lightolier are not to 
the contrary.  Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, which Lightolier 
relies on for the proposition that "pattern and practice" 
evidence is irrelevant to an individual pretext claim, simply 
suggests that statistical evidence is only "'collateral to 
evidence of specific discrimination against the actual 
individual.'"  Gilty, 919 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 115 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981)).  The court in Gilty 
did not suggest that such evidence is per se inadmissible.  See 
Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1253 n.7 (noting that because the court found 
plaintiff's statistical evidence of only collateral importance it 
did not have to rule on the employer's motion to strike).  The 
other cases cited by Lightolier are similar; they note the 
relative unimportance of statistical evidence in an individual 
treatment case, but they do not establish a rule that statistical 
evidence is prohibited.  See, e.g., King v. General Elec. Co., 
960 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1992); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co. & Retail 
Meatcutters, 773 F.2d 857, 865 n.6 (1985).14  More importantly, 
the charts were not tendered as statistical evidence; they were 
used primarily as testimonial aids to describe the employees' 
positions relative to key decisionmakers.  Furthermore, 
Lightolier had the opportunity to cross-examine Abrams as to the 
deficiencies or inaccuracies in his charts and did so vigorously.  
Finally, the only objection Lightolier made regarding the charts 
was to the inclusion of the ages on the handwritten charts, thus 
its objections to the admission of the charts in general is 
reviewed under the plain error standard.  Fed. R. Evid. 103(d).  
The admission of these charts was not reversible error. 
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. The court's exclusion of statistical evidence in 
Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1984), is 
distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case attempted to 
prove discrimination in part through the use of statistical 
disparity and his statistical evidence, because of sample size, 
etc., was faulty. 
 D.  Evidence of Lightolier's Intent 
 Lightolier's final argument with regard to the 
magistrate judge's evidentiary rulings is that the magistrate 
judge improperly excluded as inadmissible hearsay much of its 
evidence relating to its intent in terminating Abrams.  The 
excluded evidence concerned statements made by Lightolier 
president, Michael Whelan, and others about the Midland 
litigation and Abrams's termination.  Lightolier claims that this 
evidence was significant because it bolstered admitted testimony 
concerning how and when Whelan reached the decision to terminate 
Abrams, and because it contradicted Abrams's evidence that Kurtz 
was the Lightolier manager responsible for his termination.  For 
example, Lightolier sought to introduce the testimony of a number 
of managers who would testify that Whelan had explained to them 
at an executive meeting that he was going to fire Abrams because 
of the Midland affair.  The magistrate judge excluded this 
testimony as inadmissible hearsay.   
 Lightolier makes substantial arguments (1) that the 
statements of these witnesses were not hearsay because they were 
not offered to prove the truth of their content, but rather to 
show how early Whelan had made a decision to terminate Abrams; 
and (2) that, if hearsay, they were admissible under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(3) to show the speaker's state of mind.   See, 
e.g., Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755 (1st 
Cir. 1994).  We are not persuaded, however, that the exclusion of 
this evidence resulted in substantial prejudice.  To the 
contrary, we are convinced that the exclusion was harmless 
because the out-of-court speakers, whose statements concerning 
Abrams's discharge others would testify to, were permitted to 
testify directly to what they had said and the excluded evidence 
was therefore only cumulative evidence as to Lightolier's 
intent.15  While it is true that the excluded testimony would 
have bolstered the speaker's credibility, we can not conclude 
that its exclusion was prejudicial to Lightolier's case.  We are 
particularly hesitant to find prejudicial error when the admitted 
testimony was corroborative; Lightolier's witnesses all 
maintained that the termination decision was made by Whelan well 
prior to the termination of the Midland litigation and was based 
on the facts learned in that litigation, rather than on Abrams's 
age.16  Despite this evidence, the jury concluded that age was in 
fact a determinative cause of the discharge and we will not 
disturb that finding on this basis.   
  
                     
15
. For example, Whelan was permitted to testify as to what 
he said in the executive meeting referenced above and the 
managers in attendance were permitted to testify as to what they 
had said prior to and in response to Whelan's explanation. 
16
. While we are persuaded that Kurtz's testimony that he 
heard of the decision to terminate Abrams from someone else could 
have been admitted as nonhearsay as it was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted (that Abrams was being terminated) 
but as evidence that Whelan, and not Kurtz, had made the 
termination decision, we find this exclusion too was harmless.  
Kurtz was permitted to testify that he did not make the 
termination decision and that he learned of the decision in a 
conversation with others, App. 1386, and Whelan was permitted to 
testify that he was in fact the person who had made the decision. 
 E.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 In addition to Lightolier's objections to specific 
evidence, it argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the jury verdict.  A jury verdict will not be 
overturned "unless the record is 'critically deficient of that 
minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably 
afford relief.'"  Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (quoting Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
959 (1981)).  Evidence that should have been admitted, but was 
not, may be considered as well.  Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 
985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 We understand Lightolier to argue that the record, 
devoid of the evidence it maintains was improperly admitted and 
bolstered by the evidence that it maintains should have been 
admitted, would not be sufficient to uphold the jury verdict 
against it.  While we have already concluded that the magistrate 
judge's evidentiary rulings were not reversible error, we also 
find that the record would support the jury's conclusion that age 
was a determinative factor in the decision to terminate Abrams 
even if some of the objectionable evidentiary rulings had been 
otherwise.  Had the magistrate judge admitted the cumulative 
evidence of Lightolier's intent (evidence that we concluded might 
have been excluded in error but which was not shown to have been 
anything other than harmless error), we would still find that the 
record was not "critically deficient of that minimum quantum of 
evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief".  
Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d at 438 (internal quotation and 
citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted)).  Significantly, 
in addition to evidence that Kurtz harbored age animus and that 
Abrams was replaced by a younger employee, Abrams offered 
testimony to show that Lightolier's proffered reason for his 
discharge was pretextual.  Abrams introduced evidence that after 
Lightolier became aware of Abrams's misjudgment and alleged 
wrongdoing in connection with the Midland contract, they did not 
terminate him, but rather gave him additional responsibilities 
and salary increases throughout his remaining years with the 
company.  Therefore, the record would still contain evidence from 
which the jury could conclude, as it did, that Lightolier's 
explanation for the discharge was pretextual and that Abrams was 
terminated because of his age.  The district court therefore did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Lightolier's motion 
for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. 
 
 V.  Damages and Attorneys' Fees 
 In addition to raising issues as to its liability, 
Lightolier also appeals the back-pay and the attorneys' fees 
awards.  Lightolier maintains that the jury award for back pay 
should have been reduced by the amount of taxes that would have 
been payable had the same amount been earned by Abrams as income 
and that the award of attorneys' fees should have been reduced 
both to reflect an amount proportional to the damages award and 
for efforts expended on unsuccessful claims. 
 The question of what standard to apply in calculating 
attorneys' fees or costs is a legal question and therefore 
subject to plenary review.  Sosebee v. Rath, 893 F.2d 54, 55 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  The reasonableness of the amount of the award is 
reviewed only for abuse of discretion if the correct legal 
standard is applied and the findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous.  Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 
475 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068 (1990).  An abuse 
of discretion will have occurred if no reasonable person would 
adopt the trial court's view.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 
1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).   
 
 A.  Back-pay Award 
 Lightolier sought a reduction in the back-pay award in 
its motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in denying that 
motion, the district court held that a back-pay award under the 
NJLAD likely represented nontaxable income and that as between a 
NJLAD plaintiff and a discriminating employer, the plaintiff 
should receive the benefit of a damages award that may not be 
taxable.  Abrams v. Lightolier, 841 F. Supp. 584, 598 (D.N.J. 
1994).  Because the district court's holding rested on its 
determination of the legal standard for NJLAD back-pay awards, 
our review is plenary.  We will affirm. 
 During trial, Lightolier's expert calculated Abrams's 
lost wages using a twenty-eight percent deduction for taxes that 
would have been owing on the award if it had been earned by 
Abrams as income.  Abrams's expert testified to an amount that 
was based on gross income and on cross-examination testified that 
to account for tax liability that figure should be reduced by 
twenty percent, with a five percent margin of error.  The 
district court instructed the jury regarding damages for back pay 
in the following manner: 
 
  Now I am going to explain to you back 
pay and front pay. 
 
  In calculating the amount of back-pay 
damages to award to the Plaintiff, if you 
decide he is entitled to such an award 
because he was unlawfully discharged, you 
should first determine the period for which 
you will award such damages. 
 
 * * *  
 . . . Once you have determined the period, if 
any, for which you will award back-pay 
damages, you should next proceed to determine 
the gross amount of wages Plaintiff would 
have earned and the value of the fringe 
benefits Plaintiff would have received during 
that period had he not been discharged. 
  
  Finally, once you have determined these 
gross amounts, you should deduct the 
following amount to arrive at a final figure 
for back-pay damages. 
 
  Wages or salary or other income actually 
earned or received by the Plaintiff during 
that period. 
App. 121-22 (emphasis added).  When the court finished charging 
the jury, Lightolier's counsel objected to the instruction that 
gross pay should be used to determine the back-pay award.  App. 
129.  The district court refused to alter its charge.   
 In its post-trial motions, Lightolier requested that 
the district court reduce the back-pay award to reflect what 
would have been Abrams's tax liability on the award if it had 
been earned as income.17  Although the district court concluded 
that the back-pay award would not be taxable, it refused to 
reduce it, determining that as between the plaintiff and the 
employer, the plaintiff should reap the benefit of the exclusion 
of the award from income for federal income tax purposes. 
 Lightolier argues that the magistrate judge erred as a 
matter of law in instructing the jury that a back-pay award 
should be based on gross income, and in refusing to reduce the 
award to reflect the absence of tax liability.  Lightolier 
maintains that the award is nontaxable and that Abrams will thus 
obtain a windfall by receiving back-pay based on gross income 
without sustaining any tax liability on that amount.  Lightolier 
argues that Abrams will therefore be in a better financial 
position than if he had not been discriminated against and seeks 
an adjustment in the back-pay award to reflect Abrams's net 
income or a new trial on damages.  Because we find that the 
current law regarding the tax liability on a NJLAD back-pay award 
is not as clear as Lightolier posits, we predict that a New 
Jersey court would uphold an NJLAD back-pay award which was based 
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. When, during deliberations, the jury asked whether an 
award to Abrams would be taxable, the magistrate judge again 
explained that a back-pay award should be calculated on gross 
income and that a front-pay award should be calculated on net 
income.  App. 1652.  As clarified by Lightolier's post-trial 
motions and the district court's resolution of them, the issue 
preserved for appeal was whether net or gross wages should have 
been considered by the jury in awarding back-pay damages, not 
whether the jury should have been instructed as to Abrams's tax 
liability on the award.  See Lightolier's Reply Br. at 45 n.33. 
on gross income and we will therefore affirm the back-pay award 
in this case. 
 We find no clear answer in the law of the Supreme 
Court, this circuit, or the New Jersey courts as to whether an 
age discrimination back-pay award under the NJLAD represents 
taxable income.  While guidance is provided by the Supreme 
Court's decision in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873 
(1992), we believe the particular question posed by this appeal 
remains unanswered.   
 In Burke, the Court held that a Title VII back-pay 
award did not fit the exemption for nontaxable personal injury 
damages under the Internal Revenue Code because, while common law 
tort claims encompass "damages for lost wages, medical expenses, 
and diminished future earning capacity on account of the injury, 
[and] also [damages] for emotional distress and pain and 
suffering," as well as punitive or exemplary damages under 
appropriate circumstances, a Title VII back-pay award was 
intended to compensate for "'legal injuries of an economic 
character.'"18  Id. at 1873 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).   
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. Under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code 
"the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement 
and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of 
personal injuries or sickness" is excludable from taxable income.  
26 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).  We note that amendments to Title VII made 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allow a plaintiff to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages and thus throw doubt on the 
continued validity of the Burke holding.  See Drase v. United 
States, 866 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 The federal statute most analogous to the NJLAD in this 
case is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  However, it is 
currently unclear whether the Court's holding in Burke applies as 
well to back-pay awards under the ADEA which, unlike pre-1991 
Civil Rights Act Title VII claims, provides for an award of 
punitive damages.  Our own precedent, decided prior to Burke, 
holds that such an award is not subject to federal income tax 
under the personal injury damages exception.  See Rickel v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 900 F.2d 655, 658-63 (3d Cir. 
1990) (holding that the ADEA provides a tort-like remedy and that 
ADEA damages should therefore be treated like personal injury 
awards under the Internal Revenue Code).  Subsequent to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Burke, other courts have also held 
that ADEA awards are not taxable, distinguishing Burke on the 
ground that ADEA damages are different in substance from the 
damages available under Title VII prior to the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act.  See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 34 
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994) (back-pay and liquidated damages); 
Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 
1993) (back-pay award); Burns v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, T.C. Memo. 1994-284, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116 (T.C. 1994) 
(back-pay and liquidated damages); Bennett v. United States, 30 
Fed. Cl. 396 (Ct. Cl. 1994) (holding that back-pay award is 
nontaxable income and liquidated damages award is taxable).  
Other courts, however, have extended Burke's holding to ADEA 
awards and have found them to be taxable income.  See, e.g., 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, No. 22909-20 (U.S. 
T.C. July 7, 1993) (liquidated damages), aff'd, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (table), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994); Downey 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(settlement award of back-pay and liquidated damages), rev'g 100 
T.C. 624, No. 40 (1993); Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378 
(M.D. Ala. 1994) (liquidated damages); Maleszewiski v. United 
States, 827 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (settlement award).  
We note that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 507 
(1994), to answer just this question. 
 Where there remains some uncertainty as to whether an 
employee will ultimately have to pay taxes on a discrimination 
claim award, we are confident that the New Jersey courts would 
not require that the award be calculated on net income.  Cf. 
Wachstein v. Slocum, 625 A.2d 527, 536-37 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 
1993) (holding that a jury instruction regarding the nontaxable 
nature of a damage award is not required in claim for retaliatory 
transfer brought under Title VII and NJLAD because law after 
Burke was still unsettled as to whether the award was subject to 
tax liability), certif. denied, 636 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1993).  To 
hold otherwise where the law is unclear, places the risk of tax 
liability on the prevailing plaintiff rather than on the 
discriminating employer.  That result would not be in keeping 
with the broad remedial policies behind the NJLAD.19  See McKenna 
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. Furthermore, we note that it is not altogether clear 
that the nontaxable nature of a back-pay award mandates the use 
of gross income.  The parties have failed to cite, and our 
research has likewise failed to uncover, any New Jersey cases 
v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 827-28 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(discussing legislative policy).  We therefore conclude that the 
district court did not err in instructing the jury to consider 
gross wages in determining Abrams's back-pay award under the 
NJLAD. 
  
 B.  Attorneys' Fees Award 
 Under the NJLAD, reasonable attorneys' fees are 
available to a prevailing plaintiff as part of costs.  New Jersey 
Stat. Ann. § 10:5-27.1 (West 1993).  While the NJLAD does not 
provide further guidance in calculating a proper award, New 
Jersey courts have followed the rules established under the 
federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, in awarding fees pursuant to the NJLAD.  See, e.g., Robb 
v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 635 A.2d 586 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
(..continued) 
indicating that either gross or net income should be used under 
such circumstances.  This issue has engendered some disagreement 
in the federal courts as well.  Contrast Johnston v. Harris 
County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1580 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that nontaxable back-pay award under Title VII should 
"ideally" reflect net income), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 
(1990); Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 
960-61 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an ADEA back-pay award more 
than twice the amount of net lost wages was excessive because the 
award is not taxable and a reduction to reflect net income was 
therefore proper) with Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, 940 F.2d 542, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
although an ADEA back-pay award is not subject to income tax 
liability, an employer may not refuse to pay an ADEA judgment in 
full on the ground that the amount it withheld reflected the 
amount that the plaintiff would have had to pay as income tax if 
the award had been earned as income); Klein v. Secretary of 
Transp., 807 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (following 
Redfield and refusing to reduce ADEA back-pay damages to account 
for tax withholding). 
1993); see also McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 817 F. Supp. 498, 
518-19 (D.N.J. 1993) (using federal caselaw under § 1988 as a 
guide to attorneys' fee claim under NJLAD), rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 32 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Lightolier contends that the attorneys' fees award was 
improper in this case because it exceeded the amount of damages 
awarded to Abrams and because it did not properly reflect the 
time spent on claims on which Abrams did not succeed.  We find 
both arguments to be without merit.   
 While the amount of the compensatory damages award may 
be taken into account when awarding attorneys' fees to a civil 
rights plaintiff, there is no rule that the fees award may be no 
larger than the damages award.  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424 (1983) (rejecting a rule that proportionality of a damages 
award and attorneys' fees award is required).  On the contrary, 
the degree of the plaintiff's success will determine the 
appropriate attorneys' fee award.  See Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. 
Ct. 566, 574 (1992) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 
(1983)).  The Supreme Court's recent explanation in Farrar that a 
federal civil rights plaintiff who obtains only nominal damages 
is not entitled to an attorneys' fees award, does not abrogate 
this rule.  In Farrar, the Court noted that nominal damages 
reflect a vindication of the plaintiff's procedural due process 
rights but likewise reflect the fact that the plaintiff was 
unable to prove she had suffered any compensable injuries.  In 
such a case, attorneys' fees are improper because they do not 
reflect the plaintiff's success.  Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.20  
Lightolier's citation to Farrar therefore does not support its 
argument that the award of attorneys' fees in this case 
($546,379.59) was improper because it was greater than the 
damages award ($473,953.00).  The New Jersey cases cited by 
Lightolier are likewise unavailing, as they simply restate or 
expound on the Hensley rule, or do not concern attorneys' fees 
for discrimination claims.  See, e.g., Singer v. State, 472 A.2d 
138 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) (applying Hensley 
to a § 1983 claim).  We therefore reject Lightolier's 
proportionality argument as a misstatement of the law. 
 Lightolier also argues that the magistrate judge erred 
in not reducing the attorneys fees award to reflect time spent by 
Abrams's counsel on unsuccessful claims.  Lightolier is correct 
that a court is to consider the amount of time plaintiff's 
counsel has spent on unsuccessful claims in determining the 
appropriate attorneys' fees award.  See Robb v. Ridgewood Bd. of 
Educ., 635 A.2d at 591 (where claims are distinct, time spent on 
unsuccessful claims should not be awarded, but where claims 
"'involve a common core of facts' or are 'based on related legal 
theories'" the trial court does not have to exclude all time 
spent on unsuccessful claims) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).  
However, when the trial court applies the correct legal standard, 
                     
20
. In Farrar, the jury found a conspiracy to deprive the 
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, but found there was no 
evidence that any injuries were caused by this civil rights 
violation.  113 S. Ct. at 575.   
the court has discretion in determining the actual fees award.  
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 
367, 378 (3d Cir. 1987).  Based on our review of record, we are 
convinced that the magistrate judge carefully considered the 
claims on which Abrams did not succeed and made a reasoned 
judgment that the time spent on these claims did not justify a 
reduction in the fees award.21  Finding no abuse of discretion, 
we will affirm the attorneys' fees award. 
 
 VI.  Abrams's Cross-Appeal Regarding the Award of Costs 
 In conjunction with his motion for an award of 
attorneys's fees under the NJLAD, Abrams sought an award of costs 
and out-of-pocket expenses totaling $39,834.92, for items such as 
deposition transcripts, trial transcripts, travel, photocopies, 
and other litigation expenses.  The district court denied the 
bulk of these expenses and limited Abrams's recovery to $240.00, 
representing those items enumerated as taxable costs under 28 
U.S.C. § 1920.22  The district court limited the allowable costs 
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. The magistrate judge concluded that the amount of time 
spent on some of the claims was insignificant and that the facts 
underlying other claims were closely tied to Abrams's NJLAD 
claim.  See, e.g., App. 1666-67 ("I don't think there ought to be 
a reduction for unsuccessful claims. . . . The claims that were 
unsuccessful really don't represent any specific component of 
time or effort in this case.  In other words, in order to obtain 
a verdict that they obtained on the LAD claim, they had to 
litigate everything else."). 
22
. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides: 
 
  A judge or clerk of any court of the 
United States may tax as costs the following: 
 
on the ground that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), 
which incorporates 28 U.S.C. § 1920, limits the award of out-of-
pocket expenses in a federal diversity action.  The district 
court also concluded that Abrams had received sufficient 
remuneration for the litigation through the generous attorneys' 
fees award and that Lightolier should therefore not be 
responsible for any additional expenses.23  We conclude that the 
(..continued) 
   (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
 
   (2) Fees of the court reporter for 
all or any part of the stenographic 
transcript necessarily obtained for use 
in the case; 
 
   (3) Fees and disbursements for 
printing and witnesses; 
 
   (4) Fees for exemplification and 
copies of papers necessarily obtained 
for use in the case; 
 
   (5) Docket fees under section 1923 
of this title; 
 
   (6) Compensation of court appointed 
experts, compensation of interpreters, 
and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs 
of special interpretation services under 
section 1828 of this title. 
 
   A bill of costs shall filed in the case 
and, upon allowance, included in the judgment 
or decree. 
23
. The magistrate judge gave the following explanation in 
denying the majority of out-of-pocket expenses for which Abrams 
sought reimbursement. 
 
 [E]ven if I were to consider them as 
legitimate items of costs, it is not 
reasonable to expect the defendant to 
reimburse Mr. Abrams for all of this stuff, 
transportation and parking, secretarial 
district court applied the incorrect legal standard and will 
therefore vacate the award of costs and remand for application of 
the correct legal standard. 
 Abrams's request for costs presents an intriguing 
choice of law problem.  Where there is a statutory provision 
shifting attorneys' fees and costs in a state statute creating 
the plaintiff's cause of action, a federal court exercising 
diversity or supplemental jurisdiction over that claim should, 
under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), apply the 
state provision shifting fees and costs in the absence of a 
controlling federal statute, rule, or policy.  E.g., Security 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Contemporary Real Estate 
Assoc., 979 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1992); McAdam v. Dean Witter 
(..continued) 
assistance, binders, dividers, messenger 
service, paralegal costs--which I believe I 
have already awarded [as part of the 
attorneys' fee award]--meals, telephone 
calls.  The only thing that I believe to be 
debatable here is photocopying and 
depositions.  But the depositions under the 
federal rules are not reimbursable because 
they['re] about discovery depositions. . . .   
 * * * 
 
  That's the way you tried cases and 
you're getting paid for trying the case, Ms. 
Moses.  I am awarding -- I am permitting 
costs to be added to this in the aggregate of 
clerk's fees and the attendance fees of 
witnesses embraced by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. . . .    
  The other request for reimbursement of 
costs is denied. 
App. 1675-76. 
 
Reynolds, 896 F.2d 750, 774-75 (3d Cir. 1990).  On the other 
hand, under Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), where there is 
a valid applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, it is to be 
applied by a federal court even where the plaintiff's claim is 
based on state law. 
 Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires the clerk of the court to award certain litigation 
expenses to the prevailing party as a matter of course.  These 
routine court "costs" are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and this 
assessment as a matter of course is made whether the plaintiff's 
underlying claim is federal or state.  Under the rules of Erie 
and Hanna v. Plummer, Rule 54(d)(1) will thus trump a state cost 
shifting provision with which it conflicts.  Cf. Exxon Corp. v. 
Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 950-52  (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that 
Alaska procedural rule that allows at least minimal recovery of 
attorneys' fees in every civil appeal conflicts with Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 38 which permits recovery of fees only 
when appellee successfully defends a frivolous appeal and holding 
that federal rule must therefore apply in diversity action). 
 There is, however, no federal statute or rule providing 
the rule of decision when a federal court is asked to award 
litigation expenses other than those enumerated as section 1920 
costs.  Rule 54(d)(2) recognizes the possibility of awards of 
"attorney's fees and related non-taxable expenses" and 
establishes a procedure for asserting a right to such an award.  
This rule does not provide a rule of decision, however.  Rather, 
it and the accompanying advisory committee comment recognize that 
there must be another source of authority for such an award.24 
 The reference in Rule 54(d)(2) to another source of 
authority is consistent with the general federal caselaw rule 
that there is no fee or cost shifting except as authorized by 
statute or rule.  Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness 
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).  That source of authority need not 
be federal law, however.  Neither Alyeska nor Rule 54(d)(2), 
precludes a federal court from looking to state law to determine 
the rule of decision as to attorneys' fees in a state law case, 
and Erie requires it to do so.  Accordingly, the district court 
should have looked to New Jersey law to determine what nontaxable 
expenses related to attorneys' fees were authorized in this case. 
 Section 10:5-27.1 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated 
(West 1993), a provision of the NJLAD, provides: 
                     
24
. Rule 54(d)(2) provides: 
 
  Claims for attorneys' fees and related 
non-taxable expenses shall be made by motion 
unless the substantive law governing the 
action provides for the recovery of such fees 
as an element of damages to be proved at 
trial. 
 
Commentary to the 1993 amendment which added paragraph (d)(2), 
clarifies that this new subsection 
 
 establishes a procedure for presenting claims 
for attorneys' fees, whether or not 
denominated as "costs."  It applies also to 
requests for reimbursement of expenses, not 
taxable as costs, when recoverable under 
governing law incident to the award of fees. 
 
Rule 54(d) advisory committee's note (1993). 
  In any action or proceeding brought 
under this act, the prevailing party may be 
awarded a reasonable attorney's fee as part 
of the cost, provided however, that no 
attorney's fee shall be awarded to the 
respondent unless there is a determination 
that the charge was brought in bad faith. 
New Jersey thus authorizes an award of an "attorney's fee as part 
of the cost," using the exact same wording as the federal civil 
rights fee shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Title VII 
fee shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 
 We have found no helpful New Jersey Supreme Court or 
Appellate Division cases construing N.J. Stat. Ann § 10:5-27.1.  
However, these courts, as the District Court for the District of 
New Jersey has recently noted in a similar context, "generally 
look to cases interpreting the federal civil rights laws in 
construing the [NJ]LAD."  McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 817 
F.Supp. 498, 518-19 (D. N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 32 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 1994).  We predict that the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey would do so here, particularly in light of 
the virtual identity of the relevant texts. 
 In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 
499 U.S. 83 (1991), the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the word "costs" in section 1988 referred to the taxable 
costs referenced in Rule 54(d)(1) and enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 
1920.  We predict that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would read 
"cost" in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10.5-27.1 to refer to the costs 
recoverable by the prevailing party as a matter of course 
(assuming no judicial directive to the contrary), i.e. those 
costs enumerated in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 22A:2-8 (West 1969).25  
That statute provides no authority for an award of out-of-pocket 
litigation expense other than a specified list of items similar 
to those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.26  Florczak v. United Jersey 
Bank, 591 A.2d 1023, 1024 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
                     
25
. Rule 4:42-8(a) of the New Jersey Court Rules provides: 
"Unless otherwise provided by law, these rules or court order, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party." 
26
.  N.J. Stat. Ann § 22A:2-8 provides: 
 
  A party to whom costs are awarded or 
allowed by law or otherwise in any action, 
motion or other proceeding, in the Law 
Division or Chancery Division of the Superior 
Court is entitled to include in his bill of 
costs his necessary disbursements, as 
follows: 
 
  The legal fees of witnesses, including 
mileage for each attendance, masters, 
commissioners and other officers; 
 
  The costs of taking depositions when 
taxable, by order of the court; 
 
  The legal fees for publication where 
publication is required; 
 
  The legal fees paid for a certified copy 
of a deposition or other paper or document, 
or map, recorded or filed in any public 
office, necessarily used or obtained for use 
in the trial of an issue of fact or the 
argument of an issue of law, or upon appeal, 
or otherwise; 
 
  Sheriff's fees for service of process or 
other mandate or proceeding; 
 
 This leaves us with the issue of whether the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would interpret the phrase "a reasonable attorney's 
fee" broadly enough to include the expenses which Abrams claimed 
but was denied by the district court.  Some, like his claim for 
his own personal expenses in traveling to attend the deposition 
of another witness, clearly cannot be squeezed into that rubric.  
See A. J. Tenwood Assoc. v. Orange Senior Citizens Housing Co., 
491 A.2d 1280, 1288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 
501 A.2d 976 (N.J. 1985).  In considering Abrams's other claims, 
however, we believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would look 
to the United States Supreme Court's construction of "attorney's 
fees" in section 1988. 
 In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), the Court 
was presented with the issue of whether a fee for the work of law 
clerks and paralegals could be part of "a reasonable attorney's 
fee" within the meaning of section 1988 and, if so, whether the 
"fee" should be at the market rate charged to private clients or 
limited to the out-of-pocket cost to the attorney.  The Court 
held in part: 
 Clearly, a "reasonable attorney's fee" cannot 
have been meant to compensate only work 
performed personally by members of the bar.  
Rather, the term must refer to a reasonable 
fee for the work product of an attorney.  
(..continued) 
  All filing and docketing charges paid to 
the clerk of court; 
 
  Such other reasonable and necessary 
expenses as are taxable according to the 
course and practice of the court or by 
express provision of law, or rule of court. 
  
Thus, the fee must take into account the work 
not only of attorneys, but also of 
secretaries, messengers, librarians, 
janitors, and others whose labor contributes 
to the work product for which an attorney 
bills her client; and it must also take 
account of other expenses and profit.  The 
parties have suggested no reason why the work 
of paralegals should not be similarly 
compensated, nor can we think of any. 
 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285.  The Court further held 
that recovery should be at the market rate billed to private fee-
paying clients so long as the rate used to compensate the 
attorney was the community rate charged by an attorney who billed 
separately for the work of paralegals and law clerks.  Id. at 
288-89.  The Court thereby avoided the possibility of double 
payment that would occur if these other costs were subsumed, for 
example as part of ordinary overhead, in the attorney's hourly 
rate. 
 The types of expenses available as part of a reasonable 
attorney's fee is not, however, limitless.  We know from West 
Virginia University Hospital that the reading given "attorney's 
fee" in Jenkins, does not include fees paid for expert witnesses 
and other expenses that have traditionally been considered a 
category of litigation expenses distinct from fees payable for 
the legal services of the litigating attorney.  Thus, it includes 
only those litigation expenses that are incurred in order for the 
attorney to be able to render his or her legal services.  Under 
these rules, the following are generally recoverable under 
section 1988 when it is the custom of attorneys in the local 
community to bill their clients separately for them: 
 (a)  reproduction expenses; 
 (b)  telephone expenses of the attorney; 
 (c)  travel time and expenses of the attorney; 
 (d)  postage. 
Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994); Associated 
Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 
919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 
559 (10th Cir. 1983); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 
639 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980), and cert. 
denied, 477 U.S. 911 (1980); Dickinson v. Indiana State Election 
Bd., 817 F. Supp. 737, 752 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
 We predict the Supreme Court of New Jersey would adopt 
this same approach.  Some of the out-of-pocket expenses for which 
Abrams sought reimbursement consisted of these types of 
recoverable expenses.  The district court therefore erred in 
denying recovery because these items were not listed in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920.27  We therefore vacate the award of costs and remand to 
the district court for reconsideration. 
  
 VII. 
 The district court properly instructed the jury as to 
the standard of proof for a pretext claim of age discrimination 
under the NJLAD by requiring that Abrams prove that his age was a 
                     
27
. To the extent the district court's attorneys' fees 
award included some of the claimed expenses as overhead, 
compensating Abrams for these expenses directly will result in a 
double recovery.  Because the district court is in the best 
position to know which billable expenses it has already included 
in the attorneys' fees award, we leave it to the district court's 
discretion to determine for which out-of-pocket expenses, if any, 
Abrams has already been compensated. 
determinative factor and a but-for cause of the decision to 
terminate him.  Likewise, none of the court's evidentiary rulings 
warrant reversal of the jury verdict.  We affirm the judgment in 
Abrams's favor on the NJLAD claim and the damages and attorneys' 
fees award in his favor.  We remand only as to the award for 
costs and out-of-pocket expenses and instruct the district court 
to recalculate the proper cost award consistent with this 
opinion. 
